

Risk Management, Company Law and Procedures


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Liechtenstein House of Finance

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Overview


I. Defining Risk-Oriented Procedural Rules (ROPR)

II. The Legislature's Expectations

III. The Case against ROPR

IV. Policy Considerations

V. Theses





I. Defining Risk-Oriented Procedural Rules



Institute for Financial Services **Defining Risk-Oriented Procedural Rules (ROPR)** RM ROPR **Procedures** Feature of any Legally relevant • organisation procedures Formal / informal Private enforcement ۲ _ (liability) The larger the • organization, the Public enforcement _ more formal procedures we expect




ROPR: an instrument of financial law





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Focus: EC's Green Paper on Corporate Governance

Proposal for a board duty to


"ensure a proper oversight of the risk management processes, [...] the board of directors [having to] bear[] primary responsibility for defining the risk profile of a given organisation according to the strategy followed and monitoring it adequately to ensure it works effectively."



Institute for Financial Services Focus: Legal Relevance?

Legal relevance: Legal consequences to the presence/absence of such procedures, and/or to their quality (adequateness).







II. Expectations



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 $v\,$ Enhance Accountability of the Board of Directors / Senior Management

 ${\rm v}$, furthering corporate honesty'

v enhance investor protection

v better enforcement

v Reduce Systemic Risk



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III. The Case against ROPR



Institute for Financial Services The Case against ROPR

1. Enhancing Accountability?

2. Reducing Systemic Risk?



1. Enhancing the Board's Accountability?



Institute for Financial Services Enhancing Accountability?

- formalization of procedures
- petrification of procedures
- enhancement of firm-internal agency conflicts
- Reducing front people's responsibility
- box ticking behavior inside the firms


,formal' substantive accountability Sound business judgement?



Enhancing Accountability? – lack of substantive guidance

vague quality expectations ('efficiency', 'effectiveness', 'adequateness' etc.) uncertainty

a lack of guidance as ROPR result in many cases in procedures without clear objectives and / or substantive guidance





Enhancing Accountability? – Interference effect

ROPR

interfere with board competence to organize the firm provide easy excuse in difficult times


Reduced accountability



2. Reducing Systemic Risk?



Institute for Financial Services Reducing Systemic Risk?





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Institute for Financial Services Reducing Systemic Risk?

Creating a 'risk culture' by regulation? Empirical studies by sociologists (e.g. Parker & Gilad, 2011, on compliance): unlikely

> ROPR add something to risk (compliance, governance) awareness, but that is not a significant factor and it cannot stand alone. More important is the mindset of senior management that you cannot impose by law.



ROPR = pro-concentration effects

ROPR => "good" is measured formally rather than substantial. High level of fixed costs for procedures barrier to entry reduced price competition enhanced firm size





Reducing Systemic Risk? – Greater overall stability?

banks subject to RM-ROPR for years financial crisis! Enhancing systemic risk through risk management

- 1) Regulated models ≠ economic discussion ≠ new regulation
- 2) Over-complexity: Assumptions little understood; If assumptions fail so do the firms
- 3) Concentration the market for risk management services
- 4) Concentration in the market for data provision.



Reducing Systemic Risk? - Costs

Standardized firm-specific risk approaches Unnecessary costs => lesser profits & Inaccurate measures for some firms


> De-stabilization through ROPR



Reducing Systemic Risk? – Formalism - Flexibility

Petrification through ROPR leads to lesser flexibility in times of crisis where it is needed most.

Best governed firms (formally) were hit worst by the crisis (e.g. Adams, R.B., Governance and the Financial Crisis, 2012).





Intermediate results

- \Rightarrow ROPR do not enhance accountability. By contrast it reduces the board's accountability.
- ⇒ ROPR do not reduce systemic risk. By contrast ROPR create systemic risk.
- ⇒ ROPR is inadequate for achieving the policy objectives the legislature and regulators associate with it.



IV. Towards a better world (Policy Recommendation)



Towards a better world (Policy Recommendation)

- 1. Revealing the Core Issues
- 2. Prohibiting statutory ROPR
- 3. Empowering Shareholders



1. Core Issues



Why do we see ROPR? – Inefficiency of the political process

,Something needs to be done.

Complexity new understanding of risk

Substantive guidance costs, lack of expertise at regulator

Procedure and transparency easy solutions

 \Rightarrow ,Quick and dirty'.



Institute for Financial Services Core Issues

Statutory ROPR 'one-size-fits-all'


Liability Firm Governance



2. Prohibiting Statutory ROPR



Preliminary Considerations - Removing liability?



Institute for Financial Services Prohibiting Statutory ROPR

Default state: a world without statutory ROPR.

Regulators should be required to set clear substantive standards rather than procedural requirements.



Institute for Financial Services Prohibiting Statutory ROPR – BJR?

Judge-made procedural tests such as the BJR shall prevail, however these are case-by-case rather than general reviews abstract from the details of the corporation.



3. Empowering Shareholders



Empowering Shareholders

Let shareholders (rather than regulators and legislatures). decide on liability

Accountability concerns residual claimants most

Firm-specific adjustment



Institute for Financial Services Empowering Shareholders

Let shareholders define in the firm's articles of association. the extent and features of

- D&O liability towards the corporation, and
- the firm's liability vis-à-vis third parties (such as customers)

While the development of efficient sets of rules may take a while the firm-specific solution is likely to result in a firm-specific optimum while avoiding the perverse incentives of a no-liability regime.

Informal industry standards may assist this process.



Empowering Shareholders – Including tort claims?

Including tort claims in the contractual solution may create perverse incentives. But please note that we only deal with ROPR, not with other types of torts.

Excluding tort claims may inspire judges to frame violations of procedures as torts.

 \Rightarrow Work in progress ...



V. Theses



The legislature expects ROPR to enhance accountability of the directors and to reduce systemic risk. Both expectations are likely to fail.

The formalization and legalization of procedures has detrimental effects on the firminternal governance. ROPR enhance rather than reduce systemic risks. Non-economic reasons do not justify ROPR and their detrimental effects.

We reveal the one-size-fits-all approach of ROPR paired with private or public enforcement (,liability') as the key driver for the negative effects of ROPR.

We deem a world without any statutory ROPR a desirable state of law. Any statutory liability from violating ROPR should be removed. As a default rule ROPR should be legally irrelevant.

Instead, shareholders should be empowered to define the extent and features of D&O liability towards the corporation and the corporation's liability vis-à-vis third parties (such as customers, tort claimants) in the firm's articles of association.

This results in a world without *statutory* ROPRs but with *contractual* ROPR:

- as a consequence of damages paid to third parties as enterprise liability, and
- as a consequence of other damages stemming from failure to adopt ROPR.

Thank you!

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