

Stefan Voigt

List of Publications

Monographs

Constitutional Economics – A Primer. Cambridge University Press 2020.

Institutionenökonomik („Institutional Economics“) Neue Ökonomische Bibliothek, UTB: Fink Verlag, München, 2002 (2nd edition 2009; translations into Czech 2008 [“Institucionální ekonomie”], Chinese [2016], and Arabic [2017]; into English [2019 with Cambridge University Press]).

(together with André Schmidt) *Making European Merger Policy More Predictable*, Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 2005.

(together with Thoralf Erb, Jochen Jahraus, Uwe Mummert and Axel Schulz). *Konsequenzen der Globalisierung für die Wettbewerbspolitik* ("Consequences of Globalization for Antitrust Policy"), Frankfurt et al., Peter Lang, 2000.

Explaining Constitutional Change - A Positive Economics Approach, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1999.

Die Welthandelsordnung zwischen Konflikt und Stabilität - Konfliktpotentiale und Konfliktlösungsmechanismen ("The World Trade Order Between Conflict and Stability - Conflict Potential and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms"), Freiburg: Haufe, 1992.

Editor of edited volumes

(together with Roger Congleton and Bernie Grofman) *The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice* (two volumes). Oxford University Press 2019.

(together with Thomas Eger and Stefan Oeter) *International Law and the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions* to the XIVth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law. Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2017.

(together with Thomas Eger and Stefan Oeter) *Economic Analysis of International Law*. Contributions to the XIIIth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law. Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2014.

Design of Constitutions, Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar, 2013.

(together with Eli Salzberger) “The Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings”; Special symposium issue of *Constitutional Political Economy* (Vol. 20, 3-4, 2009).

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen) Scientific Competition, *Conferences on New Political Economy*, Vol. 25, 2008.

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen); The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law, *Conferences on New Political Economy*, Vol. 24, 2007.

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen) International Conflict Resolution, *Conferences on New Political Economy*, Vol. 23, 2005.

Constitutional Political Economy, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003.

(together with H.-J. Wagener) *Constitutions, Markets and Law – Recent Experiences in Transition Economies*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002.

(together with Manfred E. Streit) *Europa reformieren - Vorschläge von Ökonomen und Juristen zur zukünftigen Verfaßtheit Europas* ("Reforming Europe - Proposals from Economists and Lawyers concerning the Future Constitution of Europe"), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.

Papers in Journals

(111) Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality; Forthcoming in: *International Journal of Constitutional Law*

(110) (with Jerg Gutmann) “Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle.” *European Journal of Law & Economics* 49:83-100 (2020).

- (109) (with Jerg Gutmann) Traditional Law in times of the nation state: why is it so prevalent? *Journal of Institutional Economics* (2020)
- (108) Mehr Mut in der Rentenpolitik! Ein Vorschlag Wirtschaftsdienst 4:294-299 (2020)
- (107) (with C. Bjørnskov) Is constitutionalized media freedom only window dressing? Evidence from terrorist attacks, *Public Choice* 1-28 (2020)
- (106) Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der Europäischen Union – ein Vorschlag für ein besseres Verfahren, *List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik* 45(2): 213-223.
- (105) (with M. Hassan, S. Mansour, and M. Gadallah) When Syria was in Egypt's Land: Egyptians cooperate with Syrians, but less with each other. *Public Choice* (2019).
- (104) (with Bernd Hayo) "The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence." *Economics Letters* 183:108603 (2019).
- (103) (with C. Bjørnskov) "When Does Terror induce a State of Emergency? And what are the Effects?" Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64(4): 579-613 (2020)
- (102) (with Anke Gerber and Andreas Nicklisch) "The Role of Ignorance in the Emergence of Redistribution". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 163, 239-261 (2019).
- (101) (with Jerg Gutmann) "The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability." *Supreme Court Economic Review* 27(1):1-19 (2019).
- (100) (with Jerg Gutmann) "The Rule of Law: Measurement and deep roots." *European Journal of Political Economy*. 54:68-82 (2018).
- (99) (with C. Bjørnskov) "The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions." *International Journal of Constitutional Law*. 16(1):101-127 (2018).
- (98) (with C. Bjørnskov) "Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions." *European Journal of Political Economy*. 54:110-123 (2018).
- (97) "The independence of international courts – making reputation work?" *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*. 24(4):511-530 (2017).
- (96) "How to Measure Informal Institutions." *Journal of Institutional Economics*. 14(1):1-22 (2018).
- (95) (with C. Bjørnskov) "Dealing with Disaster: Analyzing the Emergency Constitutions of the U.S. States." *Arizona State Law Journal*. 49(3):883-906 (2017).

- (94) (with Alexander Wulf) “What makes prosecutors independent? Analysing the institutional determinants of prosecutorial independence.” *Journal of Institutional Economics*. 15(1): 99-120 (2019).
- (93) “Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?” *Constitutional Political Economy*. 28:1-13 (2017).
- (92) (with Jerg Gutmann and Katharina Pfaff) “Banking Crises and Human Rights.” *Applied Economics Letters*. 24:1374-1377 (2017).
- (91) (with Jerg Gutmann and Sina Imhof) “Are You Green Yet? On the Diffusion of Constitutionally Protected Environmental Rights.” *Asian Journal of Law and Economics*. 7(3): 305-322 (2016).
- (90) “Determinants of Judicial Efficiency: A Survey.” *European Journal of Law and Economics*. 42(2):183-208 (2016).
- (89) (with Bernd Hayo) “Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence.” *International Review of Law and Economics*. 48:1-13 (2016).
- (88) (with M. Gassebner and J. Gutmann) “When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants.” *Public Choice*. 169(3-4):293-313 (2016).
- (87) (with Nora El-Bialy) “Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial performance: taxpayers’ money well spent?” *European Journal of Law and Economics*. 41(2):283-319 (2016).
- (86) (with Lorenz Blume) “Does Direct Democracy Make for Better Citizens? A Cautionary Warning Based on Cross-Country Evidence.” *Constitutional Political Economy*. 26(4):391-420 (2015).
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- (84) (with Lars Feld and Jerg Gutmann) “Mehr Wirtschaftswachstum durch eine unabhängige Justiz?” *Justice – Justiz – Giustizia*. 2015/3 (2015).
- (83) (with Jerg Gutmann) “The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries.” *Public Choice*. 162(3-4):351-380 (2015).
- (82) (with Axel Dreher and Heiner Mikosch) “Membership Has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI.” *World Development*. 66:346-358 (2015).
- (81) (with Lars Hornuf) “Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is.” *European Journal of Law & Economics*. 39(2):287-311 (2015).

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- (59) “Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments.” *Public Choice*. 146(1-2):205-256 (2011).
- (58) (together with Anne van Aaken and Lars Feld) “Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? – An Empirical Evaluation Across 78 Countries.”, *American Law and Economics Review*. 12:204-244 (2010).
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- (32) “Iudex Calculat: The ECJ’s Quest for Power.” *Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie*. 22:77-101 (2003).
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- (9) "Values, Norms, Institutions, and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines*. 4:495-529 (1993).
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