Research

Written Manuscripts

Is the Democracy Premium WEIRD? A Tale of Two Countries

Fanny E. Shories
University of Hamburg

I use an economic lab experiment to quantify the democracy premium – an increase in cooperation associated with democratic decision-making – in Egypt and in Germany. The experimental design models a representative democracy and is able to control for confounding factors such as self-selection and information effects. I find large differences between the two culturally different subject pools: German subjects respond strongly to the democratic policy implementation. Egyptians show no positive behavioral response to the decision-making procedure. Varying degrees of religiosity cannot explain the results.

Correspondence e-mail: fanny.schories"AT"ile-graduateschool.de <br />(fanny.schories"AT"ile-graduateschool.de)

Cheating and Real Effort: Order and Fasting Effects

Dina Rabie^a,b, Mariam AbdelKarim^a, Mohamed Rashwan^a, Rania Miniesy^a^aThe British University in Egypt
^bUniversity of Hamburg

We present a simple observed individual cheating task and play it before (control) and after (treatment) a real effort task. We re-run the same experiment with the same subjects before and during Ramadan. Using this simple and novel setup, we find that effort does not induce cheating except when individuals are under additional exogenous restrictions. We argue that effort depletes self-control and drives cheating behavior

Correspondence e-mail: dina.rabie"AT"bue.edu.eg <br />(dina.rabie"AT"bue.edu.eg)

Preferences Reversals: Mistakes or Real Preferences?

Dina Rabie
The British University in Egypt
University of Hamburg

Using a novel experimental setup, this paper explores the relationship between reversals and risk and higher order risk preferences. The paper employs non-standard sample from Cairo, Egypt and shows that preferences reversals are significantly correlated with high order risk attitudes.

Correspondence e-mail: dina.rabie"AT"bue.edu.eg

Work in Progress

The Nexus Between Religion and Inequity Aversion: Evidence from a Dictator Game

Ahmed Abaza^a, Sara Seoudi^a, Nourhan Hassan^a, Pakinam Kikry^a, Oumaima Dridi^b, Habib Braham^b^a Cairo University
^b ESSECT Tunisia

According to the world values survey (2010-2014), most people viewed the meaning of religion in Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon to be doing good for others (59.5%, 43%, 59.1% respectively). This experiment thus aims to investigate the impact of religious/secular primes on inequity aversion, on a sample of Egyptian, Tunisian, and Lebanese subjects, in order to determine whether the actual behaviour is consistent with self-reported data on the perception of religion (doing good, acting selflessly).

Supervisors: Engi Amin and Sarah Mansour
Correspondence e-mail: sarah.mansour"AT"feps.edu.eg

Religious Discrimination and Salary Distribution

Ayman Tibi, Ghassan Hammoud, Stephanie El Khoury, Rein daher, Ranim assi, Mira serhal
American University in Beirut

We seek to investigate discriminatory behavior in the labor market against people whose outer appearance tends to reveal their religious affiliation. We have designed an experiment which would allow us to observe whether discrimination occurs or not. This experiment would add to the current literature by viewing discrimination towards veiled women from a salary stand-point. Most already existing literature focus on job attainment instead of the wage gap that disfavors veiled women. This experiment looks at discrimination towards veiled women in the middle east, specifically Lebanon. Other studies focus on countries that perceive veiled women as immigrants and not part of the population.

Supervisor: Hossein Radmard
Correspondence e-mail: hr30"AT"aub.edu.lb

Mine or Ours? An Experiment on Cooperation Within the Household

Mariam AbdelKarim, Engy Elshahawy, Nourhan Emara, and Yara Mourad
The British University in Egypt

This study aims to understand how arranged versus love marriage affect cooperation within the household. We design an investment game where couples play blindly against each other. Couples can maximize household income through cooperation while individuals can maximize own payoffs through defection. The experiment is planned to be run in Cairo, Egypt.

Supervisor: Dina Rabie
Correspondence e-mail: dina.rabie"AT"bue.edu.eg